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End of an epic? The draft agreement on the EU’s accession to the ECHR 
 
by Tobias Lock* 
Introduction 
 
This contribution aims to analyse and assess the draft agreement on the 
European Union’s (EU) accession to the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).1  The draft agreement was drawn up by a so-called ‘informal 
working group’ situated within the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee on 
Human Rights (CDDH).  The group consisted of fourteen experts, seven from 
EU Member States and seven from non-EU countries, who had been chosen 
on the basis of their experience and not as representatives of their 
governments.    The meetings were held with representatives of the European 
Commission, which had been issued with a negotiating mandate by the 
Council of the EU3, and were attended by experts from the Council of 
Europe.4  Negotiations started in July 2010 and a draft agreement was 
presented on 24 June 2011, which was endorsed by the CDDH on 14 October 
2011.  Currently, negotiations are ongoing within the European Union, with 
notably the United Kingdom and France advocating amendments to the draft 
agreement, which will be referred to where relevant to this contribution.5  
However, the core features of the draft agreement, which are the subject of 
this article, do not seem to be in doubt.   
 Over thirty years after the European Commission first mooted an 
accession by the EU to the ECHR and almost twenty years after the ECJ 
rendered Opinion 2/94, which clarified that accession would be impossible 
without an explicit competence in the Treaties, this draft agreement might 
mean the end to a discussion of almost epic proportions.6  But even if the draft 
                                            
* Dr Tobias Lock, Lecturer, School of Law, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, 
t.lock@surrey.ac.uk; I would like to thank Professor Piet Eeckhout for helpful comments.  All 
errors remain, of course, my own.  
1 CDDH(2011)009. 
3 Council Resolution authorising the Commission to negotiate the Accession Agreement of 
the European Union to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), Doc no 9689/10 (11 May 2010), which is partly classified. 
4 CDDH, ad hoc terms of reference, CDDH(2010)008. 
5 Should the EU agree to propose changes, these would then have to be negotiated with the 
Council of Europe, cf. Council of the EU, Doc no 18117/11, para 8. 
6 Pre-Lisbon publications include: H. Golsong, ‘Grundrechtsschutz im Rahmen der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften’ [1978] Europäische Grundrechtezeitschrift 346; European 
Commission, ‘Memorandum on the accession of the Communities to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ Bull. EC Supp. 
2/79; M. Ruffert, ‘Anmerkung zu Gutachten 2/94’ [1996] Juristenzeitung  624; S. Winkler, Der 
Beitritt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, 
(Nomos, Baden-Baden 2000); B. Moriarty, ‘EC Accession to the ECHR’ [2001] Hibernian Law 
Journal 13; K. Strasser, Grundrechtsschutz in Europa und der Beitritt der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention (Peter Lang, Frankfurt 2001); 
W. Schaller, ‘Das Verhältnis von EMRK und deutscher Rechtsordnung vor und nach dem 
Beitritt der EU zur EMRK’ [2006] Europarecht 656;  more recent publications include: V. 
Skouris, ‘First Thoughts on the Forthcoming Accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention of Human Rights’ in D. Spielmann/M. Tsirli/P. Voyatzis (eds), The 
European Convention on Human Rights, a living instrument (Bruylant, Brussels 2011) 555; N. 
O’Meara, ‘A More Secure Europe of Rights? The European Court of Human Rights, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union and EU Accession to the ECHR’ (2011) 12 German Law 
Journal 1813;  P. Gragl, ‘Der rechtliche Status der EMRK innerhalb des Unionsrechts. Zu den 
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agreement is endorsed by the European Union and the Council of Europe, its 
ratification may take some time.7  The EU’s internal ratification process 
requires unanimity in the Council, the consent of the European Parliament 
and separate approval by the Member States according to their constitutional 
traditions.8  Moreover, the draft accession agreement does not provide rules 
on how ECHR membership is dealt with by the EU internally.  Internal rules, 
e.g. on the details of the prior involvement of the ECJ, will also have to be 
drawn up and agreed upon by all EU Member States.9  In addition, all parties 
to the ECHR must ratify the agreement.  Given the lengthy ratification process 
for Protocol No 14, accession may not happen as swiftly as some may hope 
for.10 
 As a background to the following discussion, it is necessary to briefly 
address the situation pre-accession.  While the EU cannot be held directly 
responsible before it11, the Strasbourg Court has developed a sophisticated 
set of case law on the indirect responsibility of the EU, which is accomplished 
by holding its Member States responsible instead.  One can distinguish three 
scenarios, which are of relevance to this paper.  According to the Matthews 
decision, the EU’s Member States are responsible for violations of the 
Convention found in the EU’s primary law, i.e. mainly the Treaties.12  The 
reasoning in Matthews was based on the notion that while the Convention 
allowed the Member States to transfer sovereign power on an international 
organization, violations of the Convention by that organization would be 
attributable to them.  The Member States were thus deemed unable to escape 
their obligations under the Convention.  This reasoning was employed again 
in the Bosphorus case where the compatibility of secondary EU law (a Council 
Regulation) was at issue.13  In Bosphorus, the Court distinguished between 
acts of secondary law which give discretion to Member States in their 
implementation and those which do not.  For the latter, the Court introduced a 
presumption that acts are compatible with the Convention unless there was a 
‘manifest deficit’ in the protection of Convention rights in the concrete case.  In 
all other cases, the Member States are fully responsible.14  The final scenario 
of relevance here is a situation where there is no Member State involvement 
                                                                                                                             
Auswirkungen auf die Rechtsautonomie der Europäischen Union nach ihrem Beitritt zur 
EMRK’ (2011) 14 Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien 409; J. P. Jacqué, ‘The accession of 
the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 995. 
7 In addition, a new Opinion by the ECJ is likely. 
8 Article 218 (6) and (8) TFEU; it is important to note that the United Kingdom’s approval to 
the accession Treaty will not be subjected to a so-called ‘referendum lock’ under the 
European Union Bill.  Section 10 of the Bill makes it clear that the government may give its 
approval to the accession agreement under Article 218 (8) TFEU once the agreement has 
passed through Parliament. 
9 A classified set of draft rules have been prepared for adoption by the Council, Council of the 
EU doc no 10744/12.  
10 On the other hand, Kuijer has suggested that Russia, which had long blocked Protocol 
No 14, would be pleased to see that the EU is finally joining the Convention, cf. M. Kuijer, 
‘The Accession of the European Union to the ECHR’ Amsterdam Law Forum, Vol. 3, No. 4 
<http://www.amsterdamlawforum.org> accessed 13 December 2011. 
11 Confédération française du travail v European Communities, no. 8030/77, 13 DR 236. 
12 Matthews v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 24833/94, ECHR 1999-I. 
13 Bosphorus v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036/98, ECHR 2005-VI. 
14 See for instance M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, 21 January 2011. 
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but only action by the EU.  In the case of Connolly, it became evident that in 
such cases there is a gap in the protection by the Strasbourg Court.15  The 
Court considered that the alleged infringement was not attributable to the 
respondent Member State since it did not happen within its jurisdiction as is 
required by Article 1 ECHR.  The EU’s accession to the ECHR will close this 
gap in the external supervision by the ECtHR since after accession the EU will 
be directly responsible in such cases.   
 The following pages first discuss the effects which accession will have on 
the system of human rights protection under the ECHR focusing on the most 
relevant features of the accession agreement, such as the co-respondent 
mechanism and the prior involvement of the ECJ.  The second part of this 
contribution explores the future status of the ECHR in the EU’s legal order. 
 
 
The EU as a party to the ECHR: Changes to the ECHR system 
 
The accession agreement focuses exclusively on the ECHR system of human 
rights protection and does not directly deal with European Union law.16  The 
agreement foresees some amendments to the ECHR itself, but the details of 
the EU’s involvement in the ECHR will be regulated by the accession 
agreement to which the (amended) ECHR will make explicit reference.17  The 
most important changes concern the procedure before the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) in cases involving the EU.  The rules of the accession 
agreement are drafted in a very general and open-ended manner.  It seems 
that this was done deliberately in light of the difficulties faced by the 
negotiators.  They had to strike a balance between their aim of accomplishing 
accession and the constraints of European Union law, and in particular the 
ECJ’s strict case law on the conferral of jurisdiction on international courts, a 
stance which it recently reaffirmed in Opinion 1/09 on the European Patents 
Court.18  The negotiators therefore opted for relatively general rules in the 
draft accession agreement which would be supplemented by rules internal to 
the European Union.  At the time of writing the latter have not yet been 
publicised.19 
 
The co-respondent mechanism 
The European Union will be an unusual party to the ECHR.  The reason is 
that where EU law is at stake, there is often a separation between the 
lawmaking entity (the EU) and the executing entity (the Member State).  While 
this is not unusual in a federal setting, with which the EU can be compared, it 
is unheard of that both federation (EU) and constituent states (Member States) 
are parties to the ECHR.  Since most EU legislation is implemented by the 
Member States and since the EU only rarely acts vis-à-vis individuals, an 
applicant would usually find it difficult to ascertain who was responsible for the 
infringement of his human rights: the EU or the Member State, the authorities 
                                            
15 Connolly v. 15 Member States of the European Union, no. 73274/01, 9 Dec. 2008. 
16 Otherwise the agreement might violate the autonomy of EU law, cf. T. Lock, ‘Walking on a 
tightrope’, (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1025, 1028 et seq. 
17 Cf. Article 1 (2) accession agreement, amending Article 59 (2) ECHR, CDDH-UE(2011)16. 
18 Opinion 1/09 European and Community Patents Court [2011] ECR I-00000. 
19 A classified draft exists, however, cf. Council Document 10744/12. 
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of which were in contact with the individual.  In such a situation, an applicant 
has the option to hold one of them alone responsible or both together.  In 
either scenario a further complication arises in that a respondent might raise 
the defence that it was not responsible for the violation, e.g. because it (a 
Member State) only followed its strict obligations under EU law.20  If this were 
possible, the ECtHR would be forced to engage in an interpretation of the EU 
Treaties and possibly of the division of competence between the EU and the 
Member States, which would be incompatible with the autonomy of the EU’s 
legal order.  That autonomy requires that the procedures for resolving 
disputes will not have the effect of binding the EU and its institutions to a 
particular interpretation of the rules of EU law.21  The EU would therefore be 
unable to agree to such a model.22  This is why Article 1 of Protocol No 8 to 
the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the accession agreement must make 
provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union 
law, especially by ensuring that individual applications are correctly addressed 
to the EU and/or the Member States as appropriate.23  For this reason the 
drafters developed the so-called co-respondent mechanism.24 Further 
considerations guiding its adoption were to ensure the accountability for 
violations of the ECHR, the enforceability of judgments against the party 
which is capable of removing the violation, and to allow that party to fully 
participate in the proceedings before the ECtHR.25  Thus the mechanism is 
deemed to serve the proper administration of justice.  The draft agreement 
provides that Article 36 ECHR should be amended as follows: 
  
The European Union or a member State of the European Union may become a co-
respondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the circumstances set out in the 
Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the 
case. The admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the participation 
of a co-respondent in the proceedings. 
 
The accession agreement itself contains further details in Article 3:26 
 
2. Where an application is directed against one or more member States of the European 
Union, the European Union may become a co-respondent to the proceedings in respect of an 
alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears that such allegation calls into question the 
compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of a provision of European Union law, notably 
where that violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under 
European Union law. 
3. Where an application is directed against the European Union, the European Union member 
States may become co-respondents to the proceedings in respect of an alleged violation 
notified by the Court if it appears that such allegation calls into question the compatibility with 
                                            
20 Such situations have been explicitly recognised by the ECtHR in the Bosphorus 
presumption, which in practice has the same effect as a defence.    
21 Opinion 1/00 [2002] ECR I-3493, para 13. 
22 Cf. Lock, n 16. 
23 Protocol No 8 to the Lisbon Treaty OJ [2010] C 83/273. 
24 It is based on a proposal contained in a 2002 study by the CDDH on the technical and legal 
issues of a possible EC/EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, 
CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2. 
25 CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 33. 
26 The United Kingdom proposed to return to an earlier, narrower draft of the co-respondent 
mechanism, which was not supported by other delegations in the Council of Ministers, cf. 
Council of the EU, doc no 16385/11. 
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the Convention rights at issue of a provision of the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union or any other provision having the same legal value 
pursuant to those instruments, notably where that violation could have been avoided only by 
disregarding an obligation under those instruments. 
4. Where an application is directed against and notified to both the European Union and one 
or more of its member States the status of any respondent may be changed to that of a co-
respondent, if the conditions in paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 are met. 
5. A High Contracting Party shall become a co-respondent only at its own request and by 
decision of the Court. The Court shall seek the views of all parties to the proceedings. When 
deciding on such request the Court shall assess whether, in the light of the reasons given by 
the High Contracting Party concerned, it is plausible that the conditions in paragraph 2 or 
paragraph 3 are met. 
 
General remarks on the involvement of the co-respondent 
 
In line with its rationale explored above, the co-respondent mechanism will be 
limited to the EU context.27  In order to appreciate the unique position of the 
co-respondent it is necessary to point out the differences to a third party 
intervention and to multiple respondents.  In contrast to a third party 
intervening in proceedings under Article 36 (1) and (2) ECHR, the co-
respondent becomes a party to the proceedings and is consequently bound 
by the Court’s judgment.28  In a similar vein, both respondent and co-
respondent must agree to a friendly settlement or to make unilateral 
declarations.  In that sense the leeway for both respondent and co-respondent 
is restricted.   
 A party can also become co-respondent where a case was directed 
against both the EU and one or more Member States as multiple respondents 
from the outset.  This provision deserves explanation since it is not obvious 
why it is needed.  Where a case is directed against multiple respondents, the 
case is treated like a bundle of applications each of which is directed against 
one respondent.  They are merely joined together.  As a consequence, each 
application needs to fulfil the admissibility criteria laid down in Articles 34 and 
35 ECHR, the most important of which is the requirement to exhaust domestic 
remedies.  In contrast, where one of the parties is co-respondent, there is no 
need for the applicant to exhaust the remedies in the co-respondent’s legal 
order since the admissibility of a case is assessed without regard to the 
participation of a co-respondent.   
 The decision whether a party will be allowed to join proceedings as co-
respondent, i.e. whether its status will be changed to that effect lies with the 
ECtHR on the request of the party.  The Court has no discretion in the matter.  
Most notably, it cannot force the EU or a Member State to become co-
respondent as the status of co-respondent is voluntary.29  The explanatory 
report suggests that the question of co-respondent will only become relevant 
where an individual application was communicated to the respondent.30  
                                            
27 Where other non-Member States apply EU law because of separate agreements (e.g. the 
Schengen agreement), the EU can only be involved via the third party intervention, cf. CDDH-
UE(2011)16, para 40. 
28 The explanatory report makes it clear that there is still room for the EU to intervene in 
proceedings where the co-respondent mechanism is not applicable, CDDH-UE(2011)16, 
para 39-40. 
29 An appraisal of the voluntary character of the mechanism can be found infra. 
30 CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 45. 
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Communication only happens where an application is not clearly 
inadmissible31, which would include many manifestly ill-founded applications.  
Thus the question of whether a co-respondent should be joined will only be 
relevant in few cases.  Furthermore, the admissibility of the application will be 
assessed without regard to the participation of the co-respondent, i.e. as if the 
case were only brought against the respondent.  Thus the earliest a party may 
make request to become co-respondent is after the case has been 
communicated to the original respondent.  But the draft agreement does not 
address the question of the latest possibility for the co-respondent to join 
proceedings.  Since one of the purposes of the co-respondent mechanism is 
to allow full participation of the co-respondent in proceedings, it would seem 
appropriate that there should be a time limit for the co-respondent to join.  It is 
common for the Court to give the parties a final opportunity to make 
submissions.  Since all submissions after that are considered as unsolicited 
and will not normally be admitted to the file32, a co-respondent should not be 
allowed to make submissions after this point in time.  It follows that at this 
stage it should no longer be allowed to join either.   
 A related question would be whether in case of a referral to the Grand 
Chamber under Article 43 ECHR a potential co-respondent would be able to 
join proceedings after the referral has taken place.  The Grand Chamber is 
not limited in its examination of the case to grounds of appeal or to the 
submissions of the party requesting the referral.  Rather it ‘may employ the full 
range of judicial powers conferred on the Court’33.  Since the Grand Chamber 
allows new pleadings, there is no argument why a co-respondent should not 
be invited to join the proceedings.  Procedurally, the applicant would not be in 
a worse position. 
 The draft agreement and the explanatory report are also silent concerning 
interim measures, which the Court may designate under Rule 39 of the Rules 
of Court. Since such interim measures can only be binding on the parties to 
the dispute, they would obviously not bind a (potential) co-respondent before 
joining the case.  However, once a co-respondent has been admitted to 
proceedings, it would become necessary that the Court extends the measures 
to the co-respondent.  As the Court can act of its own motion, this should not 
cause any problems.   
 The consequence of a judgment finding a violation would be that the EU 
and the Member State(s) would be jointly responsible.34  The United Kingdom 
proposed that the ECtHR should be allowed to give judgment against an 
individual respondent or co-respondent only where the parties jointly notify the 
Court that such a differentiated judgment is appropriate.35  This seems to 
have been accepted by most other Member States in discussions within the 
Council of Ministers.36  However, this proposal should be viewed critically.  It 
would be highly problematic to give the ECtHR competence to decide on the 
                                            
31 D. Harris/M. O’Boyle/C. Warbrick/E. Bates (eds), Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 2009) 825. 
32 Ibid. 825. 
33 Pisano v Italy [GC], no. 36732/97, 24 October 2002. 
34 CDDH(2011)009, para 54. 
35 UK non-paper on the draft agreement, Counil of the EU doc no 1563/11, which proposes 
the inclusion of Article 3 (7) providing for such a possibility. 
36 Council of the EU, doc no 16385/11, p. 5.  
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internal division of responsibility between the EU and its Member States since 
such decisions are reserved to the ECJ.37  Furthermore, it is problematic from 
a procedural point of view if such a decision is made without the approval of 
the applicant.  After all, once a party has agreed to become co-respondent, 
there should not be a possibility for either respondent or co-respondent to 
escape their responsibility.  It would be better if an internal mechanism for 
resolving questions of ultimate responsibility, i.e. of who should have to pay a 
possible ‘just compensation’ awarded by the ECtHR, were created. 
 The following critical appraisal is preceded by a brief description of the 
mechanics of the mechanism, which addresses both cases in which the EU 
becomes co-respondent and cases in which a Member State becomes co-
respondent. 
 
 
The EU as co-respondent 
 
Where an application is initially directed against a Member State, the EU may 
become co-respondent where a provision of EU law might be in violation of 
Convention rights.   
 The substantive test to be carried out by the ECtHR asks it to assess 
whether the applicant’s allegations call into question the compatibility of a 
provision of EU law with the Convention.  The wording of that provision as 
well as the explanatory report to the draft agreement suggest that ‘a provision’ 
of EU law can mean a provision of either primary or secondary law.  This is 
remarkable given one of the rationales for the co-respondent mechanism is to 
account for the situation in which acts of the Union’s institutions are 
implemented by the Member States.38  Since only the EU can remove a 
violation found in its own secondary law, extending the binding reach of the 
judgment is apposite.  With regard to primary law implemented by the 
Member States, however, that rationale does not seem to apply since primary 
law is agreed upon by the Member States as well.  It is not clear from the 
drafting history whether obligations arising from primary law were included 
deliberately or whether they ‘slipped in’.  The very first draft referred to ‘legal 
acts or measures of the European Union’.39  This formulation was narrower 
and seemed restricted to secondary legislation and other measures by the 
EU’s institutions.  The next draft included the reference to ‘European Union 
law’ as one can find it in the final draft agreement.40  There is no reference in 
the explanatory report why this change was made.  This is regrettable for an 
explanation would have improved our understanding of the mechanism.   
 But there is further room for criticism.  The unambiguous requirement that 
the applicant’s allegation calls into question the compatibility of a provision of 
EU law with the Convention is unfortunately obfuscated by the subordinate 
clause following it, which states that this would notably be the case where the 
violation could only be avoided by disregarding an obligation under EU law.  
The adverb ‘notably’ would suggest that ‘disregarding an obligation under EU 
law’ constitutes a sub-category of the general requirement ‘compatibility of a 
                                            
37 Cf. Opinion 1/91, [1991] ECR I-6079, para 34-35; Lock, n 16, 1043. 
38 CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 32. 
39 CDDH-UE(2011)04. 
40 CDDH-UE(2011)06. 
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provision of EU law with the Convention’.  By referring to ‘an obligation’ the 
draft does not make it sufficiently clear whether this obligation is an obligation 
contained in the allegedly incompatible provision of EU law or whether it can 
be any obligation under EU law.  A comparison with Article 3 (3) of the draft 
agreement shows that the provision could have been drafted much clearer 
with Article 3 (3) stipulating that ‘a violation could only have been avoided by 
disregarding an obligation under those instruments [emphasis added]’.  It is 
suggested that Article 3 (2) should be understood in the same manner, i.e. 
that the co-respondent mechanism should apply notably where the violation 
could only be avoided by disregarding an obligation under that provision.   
 For the Court, the test to be carried out is only cursory.  It merely needs to 
be satisfied that it is plausible that it ‘appears’ that the applicant’s allegations 
call into question the compatibility of a provision of EU law with the 
Convention.  This, it is suggested, would normally be the case wherever an 
applicant makes an argument to that effect unless that argument is outlandish.  
If in such a case the EU expresses its wish to join the proceedings as co-
respondent, the ECtHR will normally have to accede to that wish.  
 
Member States as co-respondents  
 
The co-respondent mechanism will also operate where the application is 
directed against the EU as respondent.  The Member States can become co-
respondents in such cases if the compatibility of a provision of primary EU law 
with the Convention is in question.  This is obviously a reference to the 
situation in the Matthews case and an acknowledgement of the fact that only 
the Member States are capable of remedying the violation.  After all, if a 
provision contained in the Treaties is held to be in violation of the Convention, 
it would need to be amended according to Article 48 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU).  Thus making the Member States co-respondents in 
such a case makes sense in order to ensure an effective and efficient human 
rights protection.  A point on which neither the draft nor the explanatory report 
are unambiguous, however, is whether it is necessary that all Member States 
ask the ECtHR to be joined as co-respondents or whether it suffices if only 
some of them (or indeed one of them) do.  Judging from the mechanism’s 
rationale, only an involvement of all the Member States would ensure that the 
judgment could be executed against all of them, which would be necessary in 
order to secure a Treaty amendment.  On the other hand, such a requirement 
would leave the mechanism almost unworkable given that all 27 Member 
States would have to have expressed their wish to join proceedings before 
proceedings are finished.41  Were the ECtHR to wait until all Member States 
have declared whether they wish to join, proceedings might be unduly 
delayed.  In addition, another rationale of the co-respondent mechanism might 
be served even by having only some Member States join proceedings:  they 
would be able to defend the case from the point of view of the Member States.  
Moreover, a systematic argument can be made.  For cases in which 
proceedings are instigated against the EU and one or more of its Member 
States, Article 3 (4) of the draft agreement allows for a change of status of any 
respondent to that of co-respondent, i.e. it allows for a change of status of one 
                                            
41 On the last possibility to make a request, cf. supra. 
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Member State to that of co-respondent alongside the EU as (main) 
respondent.  Since the conditions for becoming co-respondent under Article 3 
(4) are the same as under the other provisions save for the fact that the co-
respondent was initially nominated as a (main) respondent, there should be 
no material difference.  This suggests that it is admissible under Article 3 (3) if 
only some Member States ask the Court to join proceedings. 
 One might be tempted, however, to raise two questions regarding the 
sensibility of the co-respondent mechanism in the scenario foreseen in 
Article 3 (3) of the draft.  The first question is why the EU should be held 
responsible for violations of the Convention by primary law in the first place.  
After all, it is unable to remove such violations without the consent of the 
Member States.42  There are three arguments which can be advanced in 
favour of such responsibility. The first relates to the aim of the accession 
agreement which is to treat the EU as far as possible like any other party to 
the Convention.43  As a result, it should be responsible for violations of the 
Convention rooted in its own constitutional documents.  Furthermore, 
excluding the EU’s responsibility for primary law would force the ECtHR to 
decide in each and every case brought against the EU where exactly the 
violation was located, which might conflict with the autonomy of the EU’s legal 
order.44  The final argument is that even though the EU cannot amend its own 
Treaties, its institutions are still involved in the amendment procedure laid 
down in Article 48 TEU.  Extending the binding reach of a judgment to the 
EU’s institutions is thus wise.  Thus there are good legal and symbolic 
arguments for the EU’s responsibility for its own primary law. 
 But this does not answer the second question why the role of the Member 
States should be that of co-respondents rather than that of ‘ordinary’ 
respondents.  As explained above, one of the main motivations for devising 
the co-respondent mechanism was to prevent the need for a decision on the 
division of competence between the EU and its Member States.  Yet in the 
case of primary law this aim could equally have been attained by bringing a 
case against both EU and Member States as ‘ordinary’ respondents since it 
would not be necessary for the ECtHR to pronounce on that question as both 
EU and Member States would be fully responsible.  But it seems that another 
aspect of the co-respondent mechanism was decisive:  there is no need to 
exhaust domestic remedies in the co-respondent’s legal order.  At first glance, 
this rationale seems odd as we are dealing with primary EU law against which 
there is not normally a domestic remedy.  But there are some Member States 
which recognise a possibility to challenge the compliance of the Treaties with 
the Member State’s constitution.45  Thus the extension of the co-respondent 
mechanism to these types of can pre-empt an argument by a joint respondent 
that the applicant failed to exhaust remedies in its legal order. 
 
                                            
42 This seems to have been the argument made by the French government which initially 
opposed a responsibility of the EU for its primary law: French Senate, Communication de M. 
Robert Badinter sur le mandat de négociation (E 5248) May 25, 2010, available at: 
<http://www.senat.fr/europe/r25052010.html#toc1> accessed 13 December 2011. 
43 Explanatory report, CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 7. 
44 Lock, n 16, 1038. 
45 For instance, the Verfassungsbeschwerde before the German Federal Constitutional Court 
can under certain conditions serve to that end. 
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Appraisal of the co-respondent mechanism 
 
Apart from the issues raised in the preceding paragraphs, some general 
points will be made in this section.  They relate to the voluntary character of 
the co-respondent status, the division of responsibility between EU and 
Member States after accession, and problems surrounding cases alleging a 
violation of the ECHR by omission. 
 
Voluntary character 
 
The draft is explicit about the voluntary character of the co-respondent 
mechanism when it states that a party shall become co-respondent only at its 
own request.  The rationale given in the explanatory report is that a party 
cannot be forced into proceedings where it was not named in the initial 
application.46  Yet this argument is based on a mere technicality and is hardly 
convincing.47   There is no reason why an applicant should not ask another 
party to join proceedings at a later stage provided that the procedural rights of 
that party are respected, especially regarding their right to be heard.   
Moreover, it is argued that the draft partly contradicts the rationale for 
the co-respondent mechanism.  According to the explanatory report, the main 
reason for its introduction is to avoid gaps in the participation, accountability 
and enforceability in the Convention system.48  But a voluntary mechanism 
leads to exactly such gaps.  The EU or a Member State may well decide to 
steer clear of proceedings even though they would be responsible for the 
alleged violation.  The fact that the applicant can nominate both from the 
outset does not remedy this problem since it would force the applicant to 
exhaust domestic remedies in all legal orders concerned, which is not only 
costly but also time-consuming.  It should especially be borne in mind that an 
applicant before the ECtHR does not need to be represented by a lawyer so 
that she may not even be remotely aware of these requirements.  It follows 
that the current draft only achieves sub-optimal results regarding the 
efficiency of human rights protection for individuals.   
 There is furthermore the danger that a Member State raises the 
defence that it was not responsible for the violation as the violation was rooted 
in its obligations under EU law and it had no discretion.  The draft and the 
explanatory report are silent regarding this possibility.  It is important that the 
ECtHR would not accept such a defence.  Otherwise, the human rights 
protection as regards EU law would risk being less effective than it is now.  It 
is suggested that the draft presupposes that no such defence should be 
possible.  But lacking an explicit statement to that effect, there is no guarantee 
that this will be the case. 
 Moreover, one can doubt that the voluntary character of the co-
respondent status is fully in compliance with Protocol 8 to the Lisbon Treaty.  
After all, that Protocol demands that the accession agreement should ‘ensure’ 
that individual applications are correctly addressed to the EU or the Member 
                                            
46 CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 47. 
47 This author has voiced considerable criticism of the voluntary character of the status of co-
respondent elsewhere, cf. T. Lock, ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: Implications for Judicial 
Review in Strasbourg’ [2010] European Law Review 777, 793. 
48 CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 33. 
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States as appropriate.  If the status of co-respondent is voluntary, it is not 
guaranteed that cases are addressed to the entity which is really responsible 
for the violation.  Of course, the internal rules on the EU’s membership of the 
ECHR are still not clear.  But even if these rules provide for a duty on part of 
the EU to become co-respondent in cases where the alleged violation is found 
in EU law, such a solution would be unsatisfactory as it would entrust the co-
respondent, who has allegedly committed a violation of human rights, with the 
assessment of whether it should join proceedings or not.  There would still be 
no way of forcing the EU to join as co-respondent and an applicant might be 
left without effective protection. 
 
Division of Responsibility Post-Accession  
 
Having outlined the different facets of the co-respondent mechanism, it is apt 
to enter into a thought experiment in order to predict the division of 
responsibility between EU and Member States post-accession and in order to 
assess the practical relevance of the co-respondent mechanism.  For this 
purpose, a hypothetical case study will be conducted consisting of scenarios 
which in the past gave rise to ECtHR decisions relating to EU law and 
scenarios likely to reach the ECtHR at some point after accession.   
 If the accession agreement is adopted in its current form, the main issue 
for deciding who is responsible will be the question of jurisdiction.  Article 1 
ECHR provides that the High Contracting parties secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms contained in the ECHR.  It follows 
that the EU would only be responsible where an alleged violation occurred 
within its jurisdiction.  The same would be true for the Member States.  Both, 
EU and Member State would thus only be responsible alongside one another 
where the alleged violation occurred in the jurisdiction of both.  It is therefore 
necessary to briefly explain what is meant by the term ‘jurisdiction’.  The 
ECtHR understands the concept of jurisdiction as a concept of international 
law.49  Jurisdiction in international law is commonly defined as the authority of 
the state to regulate the conduct of persons by means of its own domestic 
law.50  If this concept of jurisdiction is equally applied to the EU, a person 
would be in its jurisdiction where an EU act, be it legislative, executive or 
judicial regulates their conduct.  This means in effect, that wherever EU law is 
applicable, a person is within the jurisdiction of the EU.51  As the case law on 
the Member States’ responsibility for EU acts shows, situations can occur 
where the Member States would be responsible as well.  This is either the 
                                            
49 Bankovic and others v Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom [GC], no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII, para 57; recently 
confirmed in Al-Skeini and others v United Kingdom, no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, para 131. 
50 V. Lowe, International Law (OUP, Oxford 2007) 170; M. Milanovic, ‘From compromise to 
principle: clarifying the concept of state jurisdiction in human rights treaties’, [2008] Human 
Rights Law Review, 411 (420); Milanovic is highly critical of the ECtHR’s adoption of this 
definition and argues that it is too restrictive for a human rights treaty by being primarily based 
on territory. 
51 In the discussions following the adoption of the draft, the United Kingdom made a proposal 
to clarify what ‘jurisdiction’ means in regard to the EU, cf. Council of the EU, Doc no 16385/11.  
This does not seem necessary given the ECtHR’s case law on the matter.   
12 
 
case where the Member States have implemented EU legislation52 or where a 
court of a Member State has made a preliminary reference to the ECJ.53  
Reflecting this, the explanatory report to the draft agreement mentions three 
cases ‘which might have certainly required the application of the co-
respondent mechanism’.54 They are Matthews55, Bosphorus56, and 
Kokkelvisserij57.  The factual scenarios underlying these cases will be used to 
illustrate the functioning of the co-respondent mechanism.   
 As a preliminary point, it is obvious that in cases like Connolly where there 
was no Member State involvement, nothing will change: they will remain 
outside the Member States’ jurisdiction, so that only the EU will be 
responsible.  As explained above, the mechanism presupposes that the 
Member States continue to be responsible for violations of the Convention 
brought about by EU law where they implemented such legislation whether 
they had discretion or not.  Otherwise accession by the EU to the ECHR as 
conceived in the draft agreement would lead to new gaps in the human rights 
protection, which accession aims at removing.   
 In a scenario like Bosphorus, where a Member State implemented an EU 
Regulation, the action would occur within the respondent Member State’s 
jurisdiction so that it would remain responsible for the violation.  The EU would 
be free to join proceedings as a co-respondent.  A different question is, 
however, whether under the new rules the applicant could choose not hold the 
implementing Member State responsible in a Bosphorus-type scenario but the 
EU instead arguing that the legislation as such was in violation of the 
applicant’s Convention rights.  Firstly, the applicant would have to be within 
the jurisdiction of the EU according to Article 1 ECHR.  Considering that an 
EU Regulation is directly applicable and thus regulates the conduct of persons 
on the territory of the EU (i.e. in the Member States) this would be the case.  
Second, in order to bring an admissible application, the applicant would have 
to be a victim of a violation according to Article 34 ECHR.  This would be 
more problematic here since the applicant would bring the case against a 
piece of legislation and not an implementing act.  For a person to be 
considered a victim where there is no implementing act, the ECtHR requires 
that a provision applies automatically, i.e. without further implementation58 or 
that its very existence continuously and directly affects the individual.59  It 
follows that where a provision merely grants national authorities the power to 
act, the applicant would not normally be considered a victim since his legal 
position is only affected once this power is used.  Bosphorus is a case in point.  
The mere existence of a power of Member State authorities to impound an 
aircraft would not have affected Bosphorus’ right to property.  Only once the 
authorities had made the order to impound the aircraft were the carrier’s rights 
affected.  Thus post-accession an applicant in the same situation as 
Bosphorus would not be able to bring a case directly against the EU, but 
                                            
52 Bosphorus, n 13.  
53 Kokkelvisserij v. Netherlands, no. 13645/05, 20 Jan. 2009. 
54 CDDH-UE(2011)16, fn. 18. 
55 Matthews, n 12. 
56 Bosphorus, n 13. 
57 Kokkelvisserij, n 53. 
58 Marckx v Belgium, no. 6833/74, Series A no 31, para 27. 
59 Dudgeon v United Kingdom, no 7525/76, Series A no 45, para 41. 
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would have to address it to the Member State.  The Bosphorus scenario is 
thus a prime example of a case in which the involvement of the EU as co-
respondent makes sense.  This is confirmed by the wording of Article 3 (2) of 
the draft agreement, which says that the co-respondent mechanism would 
notably apply where the violation could have been avoided only by 
disregarding EU law.60   
 However, there is no requirement in the wording of Article 3 (2) of the 
draft agreement that there must not be any Member State discretion.  This is 
confirmed by the drafting history of the provision.  In contrast to the first 
revised draft, which was clearly modelled on Bosphorus61 and required the 
existence of a normative conflict between a Member State’s obligations under 
EU law and under the ECHR, no such requirement is contained in the final 
version of the draft agreement on accession.  Since many EU law obligations 
leave a degree of discretion to the Member State, there are potentially a lot 
more cases capable of engaging the EU as co-respondent than if the co-
respondent mechanism had been restricted to cases where there was no 
Member State discretion.62  
 The facts underlying the recent M.S.S. case, however, show that the co-
respondent mechanism would not be applicable in all cases where a Member 
State has implemented its obligations under EU law.63  The applicant was an 
asylum seeker who entered the EU via Greece and applied for asylum in 
Belgium.  On the basis of Article 10 (1) of the EU’s Dublin Regulation64, 
Belgium sent him back to Greece since it is the responsibility of the Member 
State through which the asylum seeker first entered the EU to examine his 
application for asylum.65  The ECtHR quoted the Dublin Convention and other 
EU law among the ‘relevant law’ for its decision.  But a request by the EU to 
be admitted as co-respondent would not have been allowed since the 
compatibility of the Dublin Regulation with the Convention was not at question 
in the proceedings.  The applicant only claimed that his treatment by Greece 
and Belgium violated the Convention.  No argument was made regarding the 
compatibility of the Dublin Regulation and there was no reason to assume that 
the relevant provisions of the Dublin Regulation fell foul of the standards 
required by the ECHR.  The M.S.S. case shows that the co-respondent 
mechanism will normally only be engaged where an applicant claimed that the 
legal basis for Member State action contradicts the ECHR.  Thus, for instance, 
in a case brought against an EU Arrest Warrant, the involvement of the EU 
would depend upon whether the applicant also alleges that the Council’s 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA was also in violation of the ECHR and not 
                                            
60 Emphasis added. 
61 Art. 4, CDDH-UE(2011)06, which requires for the co-respondent mechanism to apply that 
‘[…] an act or omission underlying an alleged violation notified could only have been avoided 
by disregarding an obligation under [EU] law […]’. 
62 A further question would be whether the ECtHR should continue its Bosphorus presumption.  
There are good arguments that it should not, cf. Lock, n 47, 797. 
63 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, 21 January 2011. 
64 Council Regulation 343/2003/EC OJ [2003] L 50/1. 
65 As was rightly noted by the ECtHR, Belgium was not under a strict obligation to send back 
the applicant.  It could have decided to investigate the case itself but chose not to do so, 
M.S.S., para 339. 
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only its application by the Member State’s authorities.  The only way of 
involving the EU in cases like M.S.S. would be as a third party intervener.66   
 In contrast to Bosphorus and M.S.S., the Matthews case dealt with the 
responsibility of a Member State for a provision of EU primary law.  The 
applicant complained against not being able to register as a voter in the 
elections to the European Parliament.  Her application to that effect had been 
rejected by the authorities of Gibraltar whose actions were attributable to the 
United Kingdom.  In the original case, the United Kingdom was held 
responsible for the violation as the European Community’s 1976 Act on Direct 
Elections was part of primary EU law, for which the Member States are 
responsible.  If a case like Matthews arose after accession, the applicant 
would still be able to hold the Member State responsible as the rejection to 
add her to the electoral register must be considered an implementing act so 
that the alleged violation would occur within the jurisdiction of the Member 
State.  But the violation would equally occur within the jurisdiction of the EU.  
In contrast to the situation in Bosphorus, the applicant would also be the 
victim of a violation by the EU since the 1976 Act directly determined her legal 
position.  The applicant would thus have a choice, whom to hold responsible.  
As regards the co-respondent mechanism, the EU would be eligible to 
become co-respondent where the case is brought against a Member State.  
Equally, where the case is brought against the EU, one or more Member 
States would be able to become co-respondents.67   
 A provision of primary law which is likely to come under attack after 
accession is Article 263 (4) TFEU.  It allows individuals to challenge acts of 
the EU institutions where an act is addressed to them, where it concerns them 
directly and individually or where it is a regulatory act which entails no 
implementing measures.  In its famous UPA ruling, the ECJ confirmed its old 
case law68 that an applicant is only individually concerned where she belongs 
to a ‘closed group’ of applicants, i.e. persons with ‘certain attributes peculiar to 
them, or by reason of a factual situation which differentiates them from all 
other persons and distinguishes them individually in the same way as the 
addressee’.69  Under ex Article 230 (4) TEC, this meant that where there was 
an act which did not entail implementing measures, i.e. which was self-
executing, it could not be directly challenged by an affected individual before 
the ECJ.  In UPA the ECJ argued that this was not in violation of the right to 
an effective remedy guaranteed by Articles 6 and 13 ECHR despite severe 
doubts as to that result raised by Advocate General Jacobs.70  The Lisbon 
Treaty made an attempt at plugging this potential hole in the judicial protection 
of individuals by introducing a right to challenge ‘regulatory acts’ which do not 
entail implementing measures.  But according to a recent decision by the 
General Court regulatory acts are non-legislative acts71, so that in cases 
where e.g. a Council regulation does not require implementing measures, 
                                            
66 The explanatory report states that the third party intervention ‘may often be the most 
appropriate way to involve the EU’, CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 40. 
67 On the question whether all of them would have to become co-respondents, cf supra. 
68 Starting with Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95. 
69 Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6719, para 36. 
70  Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6681, Opinion of AG 
Jacobs. 
71 Case T-18/10 Inuit Tapiritt Katanami v Parliament and Council, 6 September 2011, paras 
36-56 (under appeal as Case C-583/11). 
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there is still no possibility for an individual to directly challenge it before the 
ECJ.  Were an unsuccessful applicant to bring a case to the ECtHR claiming 
violation of Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, she would only be able to bring the case 
against the EU as the main respondent since due to a lack of an implementing 
measure the violation did not occur in the jurisdiction of the Member States.72  
They would, however, be able to join as co-respondents.   
 Kokkelvisserij, the final case in this analysis, differs from the previously 
mentioned cases. The applicant co-operative essentially alleged a failure to 
legislate and did not claim that a provision of EU law restricted it in its rights.  
The applicant argued that it should have been given an opportunity to respond 
to the submissions of the Advocate General before the ECJ, which allegedly 
violated its right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR.  It argued in 
particular that Article 61 of the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure granted the ECJ 
discretion over the reopening of the oral procedure which was in violation of 
the Convention since it deprived the applicant of a guaranteed right to 
respond.  In essence, the applicant therefore argued that the Rules of 
Procedure were insufficient and violated the Convention.  The Rules of 
Procedure are of a sui generis legal nature since they are laid down by the 
Court itself with the approval of the Council.73  The case therefore dealt with 
an alleged violation attributable to the EU.  The only reason why the ECtHR 
considered that the alleged violation occurred within the respondent state’s 
jurisdiction was that a domestic court had made a request for a preliminary 
ruling to the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU.  Assuming that an EU Member 
State would still be responsible in cases which came before the ECJ by way 
of a preliminary reference after accession, the question is whether the EU 
would be able to become co-respondent.  Since the Rules of Procedure, 
despite their sui generis nature, must be regarded as ‘a provision of European 
Union law’ the compatibility of which with the Convention was in question, on 
a strict reading of the wording of Article 3 (2) of the draft agreement the co-
respondent mechanism would have been applicable.  But the scenario in 
Kokkelvisserij is anomalous for two reasons:  first, the only reason why the 
Member State could be taken to the ECtHR was that its own domestic court 
had requested a preliminary ruling.  Had the case come before the ECJ by 
way of a different procedure, the Member State would not have been 
responsible.  Second, there was already some (allegedly insufficient) 
legislation in place, the compatibility of which with the ECHR was at question.  
Thus the question of compatibility of that legislation with the Convention could 
be raised which is one of the preconditions for the involvement of a co-
respondent.  Yet in cases where not even insufficient legislation exists, it 
would be questionable whether the co-respondent mechanism would apply.   
 The example of Kokkelvisserij thus brings us to the more general question 
of how alleged violations by omission would be dealt with after accession.   
 
The case of omissions 
 
It is well-established in the case law of the ECtHR that the Convention is not 
only violated where a High Contracting Party actively interferes with an 
                                            
72 This would be similar to Connolly, supra. 
73 B. Wegener, ‘Art. 253 AEUV’ in C. Calliess/M. Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV (C.H. Beck, 
München 2011) para 8. 
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individual’s rights but also where it fails to act provided that the Convention 
contains a positive obligation to do so.74  Cases concerning the EU can either 
deal with alleged failures to legislate or with failures by the executive to act.  
The latter would be relatively unproblematic.  Where an applicant alleges that 
one of the EU’s institutions has failed to act, the addressee of a subsequent 
application to the ECtHR would clearly be the EU.75  But where failures to 
legislate are concerned, the correct addressee cannot easily be determined.  
The problem with legislative competences is that they are divided between the 
EU and its Member States so that both could potentially be held responsible 
in the ECtHR.  The provisions in the draft agreement do not specifically 
mention omissions but it is clear from its preamble and the explanations to it 
that violations of the ECHR by omission are covered, too.76   
 The problem is that strictly speaking, the Member States are not 
responsible for violations of the Convention by omission where the EU had 
the exclusive competence to act.  The reverse is true for the EU where the 
Member States had the competence to act.  If such a case came before the 
ECtHR, the Court might therefore be prompted to investigate the division of 
competences between EU and Member States.  However, such an 
investigation would violate the autonomy of EU law as it would necessitate a 
binding interpretation of EU law by the ECtHR.77  This could be avoided if the 
co-respondent mechanism were to ensure that both could be held responsible.   
Yet the formulation in the article concerning the co-respondent mechanism 
does not seem to cover all potential cases in this respect.  In order to show 
this it is necessary to distinguish different scenarios in which an applicant may 
allege a violation of his Convention rights by omission.  One scenario 
concerns cases where a provision of EU law mandates action by a Member 
State.  In such a case, the applicant can hold the Member State responsible 
for a failure to comply.  The EU would not be able to become co-respondent 
since EU law would not be challenged.  Another scenario would concern 
cases where no legal provision exists, neither at EU level nor at Member 
State level.  This scenario would differ from that in Kokkelvisserij where by 
coincidence there was already some legislation in place which the applicant 
argued insufficiently protected her rights.  However, on a literal reading the 
mechanism would be inapplicable since in this scenario no claim would be 
made that a provision EU law was not in compliance with the Convention 
since the non-existence of such a provision is the problem.  Thus there is a 
lacuna in the provision concerning the co-respondent mechanism which 
raises doubts as to the compliance of the draft agreement with Article 1 of 
Protocol 8 to the Lisbon Treaty, which demands that the accession agreement 
should ensure that applications are addressed to the correct entity.  With 
regard to cases of alleged omissions to legislate arising outside the rather 
                                            
74 E.g. Artico v Italy, no. 6694/74, Series A no 37, para 33; Marckx v Belgium, no. 6833/74, 
Series A no 31, para 31; Gaskin v UK, no. 10454/83, Series A no 160, para 41; Airey v 
Ireland, no. 6289/73, Series A no 32, paras 31-33; X and Y v The Netherlands, no. 8978/80, 
Series A no 91, paras 24-30; López Ostra v Spain, no. 16798/90, Series A no 303-C, para 51. 
75 The applicant would of course be required to first exhaust the remedy provided in Article 
265 (3) TFEU.  
76 Its preamble expressly recognises the right of individuals to submit omissions of the EU to 
the external control of the ECtHR. 
77 Cf. Opinion 1/91, [1991] ECR I-6079, para 34-35. 
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specific circumstances of Kokkelvisserij the draft agreement fails to deliver on 
this point.   
 
Overall comment 
 
The preceding analysis has shown that the division of responsibility between 
the EU and the Member States after accession will not always be easy to 
determine.  This is largely due to the ECtHR’s understanding of jurisdiction 
and the limitations of the co-respondent mechanism, especially regarding its 
voluntary nature.  The consequence is that the determination of the correct 
respondent can at times appear random.  This is probably best illustrated by 
the peculiar set of facts in the Kokkelvisserij case, where the only reason why 
a Member State could be held responsible for an alleged procedural deficit of 
an EU institution (the Court of Justice) was because the case had reached the 
ECJ by way of a preliminary reference.  While this is a less serious issue, the 
question of who should be responsible for legislative inaction remains largely 
unresolved.  A differently designed co-respondent mechanism would be 
capable of addressing all these points.  Two changes would appear 
appropriate.  First, the co-respondent should not be allowed to refuse being 
joined to proceedings.  Second, the scope of application of the mechanism 
ought to be extended: wherever a question of EU law arises, the respondent 
should be able to request a potential co-respondent to join.  This would avoid 
gaps in the responsibility and, importantly, it would remove the danger of the 
ECtHR delineating the competences between EU and Member States.78 
 
Prior Involvement of the ECJ where the EU is co-respondent 
 
A further novelty which accession will bring is closely connected to the co-
respondent mechanism: the possibility of an involvement of the ECJ in such 
proceedings creating an institutional link between the two European courts.  
As has been pointed out above, one of the advantages for an applicant in 
cases where the EU is co-respondent before the ECtHR is that he does not 
need to exhaust the remedies available before the ECJ.  Exhaustion of 
domestic remedies in the respondent Member State is sufficient.  This can 
lead to a situation where the compatibility of a provision of EU law with the 
Convention is assessed without the ECJ having had a chance to pronounce 
on the question.  Presumably, in the vast majority of cases the ECJ will have 
been involved via the preliminary reference procedure laid down in Article 267 
TFEU, but such involvement is not guaranteed.  National courts are under a 
duty to make a reference either where they are courts of last resort79 or, 
independently of their place in the hierarchy, where the validity of EU 
legislation is at issue since they must not infringe the ECJ’s monopoly to 
declare such legislation void.80  But these rules are not watertight.  There are 
a number of conceivable reasons why in situations where the co-respondent 
mechanism applies a national court may not have made a reference.  One 
(unlikely) possibility is that the national court was unaware of its duty to make 
a reference.  In a more probable scenario a national court would come to the 
                                            
78 A more detailed discussion of this proposal can be found in Lock, n 47, 786. 
79 Article 267 (3) TFEU. 
80 Case 314/85, Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, [1987] ECR 4199, para 15. 
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conclusion that the provision of EU law in question was not incompatible with 
fundamental rights and was therefore valid.  In contrast to determinations of 
invalidity, national courts have a right to consider provisions of EU law valid 
on their own devices.81  This situation might arise relatively often since the 
test for the applicability of the co-respondent mechanism is rather superficial:  
it would be sufficient for the co-respondent mechanism to apply if it appears 
that the applicant’s allegations call into question the compatibility of a 
provision of EU law with the Convention.  Given the tendency of counsel to 
support their client’s case with every conceivable argument, such calling into 
question is prone to happen relatively often.  Claims of this kind may often 
appear far-fetched and may thus induce the national court to ignore them.  
Thus there is a realistic chance that the ECtHR might rule on the compatibility 
of a provision of EU law with human rights, and thus indirectly on the validity 
of that provision under EU fundamental rights law, without the ECJ having had 
a chance to remedy the violation.82   
 Before this background, the Presidents of the two European Courts 
issued a joint communication urging for a flexible procedure allowing the ECJ 
to carry out an internal review before the ECtHR has carried out its external 
review.83  The Presidents named the principles of subsidiarity as the 
underlying reason for a prior involvement of the ECJ.84  This argument, 
however, is not compelling.  While it is true that a review by the ECJ might 
remedy the violation and thus reduce the workload of the ECtHR, the 
introduction of a specific procedure guaranteeing a prior involvement of the 
ECJ leads to a privileging of the EU’s legal order over the legal orders of other 
parties to the Convention.  The fact that the ECJ may not get involved in some 
cases is down to a deficit of protection in the EU’s legal order in that there is 
often no possibility for an individual to have the legislation at issue reviewed in 
any other way but by a preliminary reference.85  If the EU considers this to be 
problematic it should try to fix the problem within its own legal system.  
Moreover, there are parties to the ECHR where a similar situation to that of 
the EU exists.  For instance, in Italy, there is no direct access to the Italian 
Constitutional Court for individuals but only indirect access through another 
court.  But there is no special procedure before the ECtHR to accommodate 
for this.  Thus there have been cases in which an individual was able to file an 
admissible application to the ECtHR against Italy without a previous decision 
                                            
81 Ibid, para 14; under the draft agreement, the CILFIT case law (Case 283/81 [1982] ECR 
3415) would not play an important role since the co-respondent mechanism would only be 
applicable where the validity of a provision of EU law is at stake and not in cases concerning 
a mere interpretation of EU law.  
82 Of course, the number of cases would still be low as the application of the co-respondent 
mechanism and thus of the prior involvement mechanism would depend on the case actually 
being communicated, cf. supra. 
83 Joint communication from the Presidents Skouris and Costa 
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf> 
accessed 13 December 2011; similar arguments were advanced before, e.g. by former ECJ 
Judge Timmermans, L’adhésion de l’Union Européenne à la Convention  européenne des 
Droits de l’homme, intervention at a hearing before the European Parliament’s Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs, 18 March 2010 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201003/20100324ATT71235/20100
324ATT71235EN.pdf> accessed 13 December 2011. 
84 Ibid. 
85 The only possibility is the (still) rather narrowly phrased Article 263 (4) TFEU. 
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of the Constitutional Court.86  The prior involvement seems to go against this 
spirit.   
 The drafters of the accession agreement apparently did not share these 
concerns and adopted the position of the two presidents.87  The accession 
agreement contains the following Article 3 (6): 
 
In proceedings to which the European Union is co-respondent, if the Court of Justice of the 
European Union has not yet assessed the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of 
the provision of European Union law as under paragraph 2, then sufficient time shall be 
afforded for the Court of Justice of the European Union to make such an assessment and 
thereafter for the parties to make observations to the Court. The European Union shall ensure 
that such assessment is made quickly so that the proceedings before the Court are not 
unduly delayed. This paragraph shall not affect the powers of the Court.88 
 
This draft provokes three questions: (1) which circumstances trigger the 
procedure; (2) what should be the procedure before the ECJ; and (3) what are 
consequences of the ECJ’s decision for the proceedings before the ECtHR?  
 
Circumstances triggering the prior involvement 
 
It is clear from the wording of the provision that there can only be a prior 
involvement in cases where the EU is co-respondent.  But this provokes the 
question of how to deal with a situation where both the EU and the Member 
State are ‘normal’ respondents.  Such a situation can arise where the 
applicant nominates both as respondents from the outset and the EU does not 
opt to become co-respondent.89  As we have seen, in such a case the 
applicant must exhaust the domestic remedies in the Member State and in the 
EU.  Thus one might think there cannot be an issue.  However, where, for 
instance, the applicant’s case is based on a violation of the Convention 
brought about by an EU Directive or by primary law, she has no domestic 
remedy under EU law.90  If in the proceedings before the court of the Member 
State the national court does not make a reference to the ECJ, the case 
would be decided by the ECtHR without an involvement of the ECJ.  This 
solution compares oddly to a situation in which the EU is co-respondent since 
in such a case the ECtHR would have to give the ECJ the opportunity to make 
a decision, the only difference between the two cases being the status of the 
EU in the proceedings.  One could, of course, consider applying the co-
respondent mechanism by analogy.  But it is submitted that this would 
privilege the EU even more since it is entirely in its own hands to decide that it 
wishes to be a co-respondent which would bring with it the ‘perk’ of having the 
case reviewed by the ECJ as well.  This would not only be compatible with the 
                                            
86 Article 134 of the Italian Constitution and legge costituzionale 9 febbraio 1948 , n. 1; 
Brozicek v Italy, no 10964/84, 19 December 1989; Immobiliare Saffi, no. 22774/93, 28 July 
1999; de Jorio v Italy, no 73936/01, 6 March 2003. 
87 CDDH-UE (2011)16, para 58. 
88 CDDH-UE(2011)10. 
89 This argument assumes that a situation is conceivable where a ‘victim’ according to 
Article 34 ECHR can be in the jurisdiction of the EU and of a Member State at the same time.  
90 Where Regulations are concerned, the latest case law of the General Court on the newly 
formulated Article 263 (4) TFEU suggests that she would not have a remedy either, cf. Case 
T-18/10 Inuit Tapiritt Katanami v Parliament and Council, 6 September 2011, nyr, para 39 et 
seq.; Case T-262/10 Microban v Commission, 25 October 2011, nyr, para 21. 
20 
 
wording of the provision on prior involvement but also in comparison with 
cases in which the EU is the sole respondent.91  Here, too, the applicant need 
only exhaust the domestic remedies available under EU law, of which there 
may be none available to her.  Thus the prior involvement should only occur in 
strict accordance with the wording of Article 3 (6) of the draft. 
 Regarding the substantive requirement, the ECJ may be involved where it 
‘has not yet assessed the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of 
the provision of European Union law’.  This requirement points to a further 
complication in that it does not simply ask whether the ECJ has ruled in the 
case, but whether the ECJ has also assessed the rights at issue.  The 
background appears to be that under the preliminary reference procedure, the 
ECJ is limited to answering the questions put before it, which may not have 
dealt with the compatibility of the provision with the fundamental rights.  In 
such a situation, a further involvement of the ECJ may thus be required.  But 
under which exact circumstances must the ECJ be deemed to have 
pronounced on the Convention rights at issue?  Since the ECJ will normally 
base its findings on the rights contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
and not directly on the Convention, further analysis will become necessary.  In 
making its decision whether to involve the ECJ, the ECtHR will need to 
scrutinize a prior preliminary ruling as to whether the discussion by the ECJ in 
substance dealt with the Convention rights at issue in the case before the 
ECtHR.  But it is submitted that the ECtHR’s task will not be too onerous.  
While the question of corresponding rights between Charter and Convention 
is somewhat debated92, with regard to the necessity of a prior involvement of 
the ECtHR it will only have to assess whether the rights protected in the 
ECHR have been substantively covered by the ECJ.  This examination is 
comparable with that carried out by the ECtHR when dealing with the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies.  The Court already requires applicants to 
raise all their grievances before the national instances.  As far as they fail to 
do so, their complaint is declared inadmissible.  The scrutiny to be carried out 
regarding the prior involvement will be substantially the same.   
 
Procedure before the ECJ 
 
The draft is silent on the procedure before the ECJ where the ECJ is involved 
under the prior involvement provision.  The details of the ECJ’s involvement 
will have to be laid down in the EU’s internal rules on ECHR membership.  At 
the time of writing, there have not yet been any official pronouncements on 
the matter.  It is clear, however, that the ECJ can only be given new functions 
as far as the autonomy of EU law permits.  In this respect it is of importance 
that the new procedure does not lead to a hidden Treaty amendment.  The 
ECJ summarised its autonomy case law in Opinion 1/00 and stated in 
particular that ‘the essential character of the powers of the Community and its 
institutions remain unaltered.’93  A detailed discussion of this question would 
                                            
91 Admittedly, in cases where there is implementing action by a Member State it would be 
strategically inadvisable to hold only the EU responsible since it may well have happened that 
the Member State added another violation when implementing the provision of EU law.   
92 Cf. Article 52 (3) CFR; instructive on this question: P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (OUP, 
Oxford 2010) 232-233. 
93 Cf. Opinion 1/00 [2002] ECR I-3493, para 12. 
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go beyond the remit of this paper.94  On a narrow view of the autonomy of the 
EU legal system, the prior involvement of the ECJ would have to be based on 
already established procedures since otherwise a Treaty amendment would 
be necessary.  One way would be to allow for a prior involvement of the ECJ 
by putting the European Commission in charge of instigating proceedings  in 
accordance with Article 263 TFEU.  This way, the ECJ would not be given any 
powers so that there would be no conflict with the autonomy principle.  And 
since the Commission would probably represent the EU before the ECtHR95, it 
would be familiar with the case and the questions at issue and thus be in an 
ideal position to decide whether to involve the ECJ.  But there may be issues 
with the two-month time-limit for challenging Union acts laid down in 
Article 263 (6) TFEU.   
 One could equally adopt a broader view, allowing for the creation of a new 
procedure for prior involvement to be laid down in the internal rules.  In order 
not to violate the autonomy of the EU’s legal order, one would have to argue 
that the prior involvement was implicitly authorised by Article 6 (2) TEU, which 
mandates accession of the EU to the ECHR.  At first glance, this view seems 
to be far-fetched.  After all, Article 6 (2) TEU is chiefly an external competence 
and can be read as a reaction to Opinion 2/94, in which the ECJ stated that 
an explicit competence was needed for the Union to accede to the ECHR.  
The wording of Article 6 (2) TEU does not suggest that it also grants 
competence on the EU’s institutions to create a new procedure for the prior 
involvement of the ECJ.  But given that the ECJ itself has twice demanded 
that such a procedure be introduced96, and given that the new procedure 
enhances its own powers, it is likely that it will not strike it down in a 
forthcoming opinion on accession. 
 
Consequences of a decision by the ECJ 
 
The final question is what the consequences of a decision by the ECJ would 
be for the proceedings before the ECtHR.  It is clear that a finding by the ECJ 
that a provision of EU law is compatible with fundamental rights would have 
no effect on the ECtHR as it cannot replace the external control exercised by 
Strasbourg.97  However, it is still open what would happen if the ECJ came to 
the conclusion that the provision in question was incompatible with 
fundamental rights and if it were to declare it void ex tunc as a consequence.  
The draft agreement does not address this eventuality.  The main question in 
this connection is whether the applicant would lose his victim status with the 
consequence of the case becoming inadmissible.  However, there is one 
problem with such a result:  the decision by the national court which confirmed 
the violation would remain unaffected and would continue to stand as res 
                                            
94 A discussion can be found in Lock, n 16, 1045 et seq. 
95 The United Kingdom is reluctant to accept that the EU should be represented by the 
Commission in all cases, cf. United Kingdom non-paper, Council of the EU doc no 1563/11. 
96 Discussion document on certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Joint 
Communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, both available at http://curia.europa.eu 
[accessed 7 June 2012]. 
97 The accession agreement explicitly stipulates that the procedure before the ECJ cannot be 
considered ‘another procedure of international investigation or settlement’ under Article 35 (2) 
(b) ECHR, cf. Article 5 of the draft. 
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judicata.  Thus a mere finding by the ECJ that the provision of EU law at 
question was invalid would not suffice.  If nothing further happened, the 
applicant would still have to be considered a victim for the purposes of the 
Convention.  In contrast, where the national decisions have been revoked, e.g. 
where proceedings before the national courts are reopened, the applicant will 
lose her victim status.  A similar situation occurred in a case before the 
European Commission on Human Rights (ECommHR).98  In that case a 
provision of national law was revoked after an applicant had been convicted 
on its basis.  While the ECommHR ruled that the applicant had lost his victim 
status this was not simply because the legislation had been revoked but 
because the court decisions had been quashed, too.99   
 
The EU’s involvement in the bodies of the Council of Europe 
 
The accession agreement foresees participation of the EU in those bodies of 
the Council of Europe which carry out functions with regard to the ECHR.  
These are the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe.  Since in contrast to all other parties to the ECHR, the EU 
will not become a party to the Council of Europe it will not automatically be 
represented in those bodies and rules for the EU’s involvement needed to be 
drawn up. 
 The ECHR assigns a number of functions to the Council of Europe’s 
Committee of Ministers.  Most importantly, the Committee of Ministers 
supervises the execution of ECtHR judgments and of friendly settlements.100  
In order to allow the EU to partake in the Committee of Ministers for the 
purposes of the Convention, Article 7 of the accession agreement provides 
that the EU shall have a vote in these matters.  The drafters realised that 
there might be a problem with block voting in cases where the supervision of 
a judgment against the EU, either alone or together with a Member State, is 
on the agenda.  The background is that after accession the EU and its 
Member States will command twenty-eight out of forty-eight votes in the 
Council of Ministers allowing it to block every decision.  Coupled with the duty 
of loyalty, which may force the EU Member States to vote in concert with the 
EU in order to comply with the requirement of unity in the international 
representation of the Union101, there would be a serious problem in the 
supervision of the execution of judgments by the EU.  After all, it is unlikely 
that the EU would agree with a finding that it has failed to implement a 
judgment against it by the Strasbourg Court.  Thus the agreement provides 
that the rules of the Committee of Ministers should be amended for this 
eventuality.  The explanatory report reveals that in cases where a block vote 
by the EU is likely, a decision by the Council of Ministers should be adopted 
without a formal vote.102  This would mean that the voting rules would not be 
                                            
98 Sert v Turkey, no 17598/90, 1 April 1992. 
99 A similar argument is made in an earlier draft of the explanatory report, CDDH-UE(2011)05, 
para 66.  
100 Articles 46 (2) and 39 (4) ECHR. 
101 Opinion 1/94 WTO Agreements [1994] ECR I-5267, para 108.  
102 CDDH-UE(2011)16fin, para 76; this would especially affect Rule 11 of the current rules, 
which provides that a 2/3 majority is needed in order to refer the question of whether a party 
has failed to fulfil its obligations back to the Court, cf. Rules of the Committee of Ministers for 
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applied so that a majority of the non-EU Member States would suffice.  This 
provision in the draft agreement has been the subject of much criticism 
notably by the United Kingdom and France since it might set a precedent with 
regard to other international for a in which the EU and its Member States 
participate jointly.103  Other Member States do not share this view and fear 
that otherwise the impartiality of the Committee of Ministers might be 
compromised.  This suggests that with regard to the EU’s participation in the 
Committee of Ministers the last word has not yet been spoken.  In the eyes of 
this author the solution contained in the draft agreement seems workable and 
does not clearly undermine the EU’s position as regards other agreements.   
 Less controversial would be the EU’s participation in the Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, a body which is inter alia in charge of 
electing the judges at the ECtHR.  As the EU will have its own judge in 
Strasbourg, it was necessary to provide for the involvement of a delegation of 
the European Parliament in the Parliamentary Assembly.  Article 6 of the 
accession agreement provides that the European Parliament is to have as 
many delegates as the largest national delegation.104  Further details will be 
subject to an agreement between the European Parliament and the 
Parliamentary Assembly.105 
 
The effects of accession on the EU’s legal order 
 
Having dwelled on the consequences of EU accession for the ECHR, the 
implications for the EU’s legal order remain to be explored.  The article 
addresses whether accession leads to a reviewability of CFSP measures 
through the back door, the consequences of the ECHR becoming an ‘integral 
part’ of EU law and whether decisions by the ECtHR will be binding on the 
ECJ. 
 
Review of CFSP measures?  
 
As mentioned above, accession by the EU to the ECHR will close a gap in the 
ECtHR’s jurisdiction to review EU actions and omissions.  The question is 
whether the ECtHR’s new jurisdiction would also cover EU actions and 
omissions adopted under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  
As Jacqué pointed out, such jurisdiction might result in an asymmetry 
between the control exercised by the ECJ and by the ECtHR.106  As is well 
known, Article 275 TFEU has largely excluded the ECJ’s jurisdiction over the 
provisions of the CFSP and acts adopted on their basis, the only exceptions 
being claims by individuals regarding restrictive measures and cases 
concerning Article 40 TEU.  Given that restrictive measures are the most likely 
                                                                                                                             
the supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements, 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers at its 964th meeting, 10 May 2006. 
103 Council of the EU doc no 16385/11, p. 5-6. 
104 Currently Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Russia each have eighteen 
delegates. 
105 Cf. Article 6 (2) accession agreement and statement by co-chairs of PACE-European 
Parliament joint informal body 
<http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/APFeaturesManager/defaultArtSiteView.asp?ID=991> 
accessed 13 December 2011. 
106 Jacqué, n 6, 1005. 
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measures under the CFSP to fall foul of human rights requirements, one may 
ask whether there might be any cases in practice where this asymmetry in 
jurisdiction might materialize.  After all, most action under the CFSP is of a 
political rather than a legal nature.  However, the newly codified Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an exception.  Article 42 (1) TEU 
provides for missions outside the Union, which according to Article 43 (1) TEU 
includes inter alia peace-keeping, conflict prevention, and post-conflict 
stabilisation.  Such tasks are carried out by the civilian and military authorities 
of the Member States, on which the Union may draw.  Thus similar situations 
as in the case of Behrami and Saramati may occur.107  The factual scenarios 
underlying this decision can be used to illustrate the issues potentially facing 
the ECtHR as regards the CFSP.   
 In Behrami and Saramati the applicants argued that the respondent states 
were responsible for actions and omissions of their troops which formed part 
of the security presence in Kosovo (KFOR).  The ECtHR held that the parties 
to the Convention could not be held responsible for these troops as they were 
under the command of the United Nations so that their action did not occur 
within the jurisdiction of the respondent states as required by Article 1 ECHR.  
The same result as regards the Member States might be reached if an 
operation were carried out under the auspices of the EU.108   
 Regarding the EU’s responsibility in such cases, it may prove problematic 
that the types of missions described above are usually carried out outside the 
territory of the European Union.  The recent Al-Skeini decision re-emphasised 
that jurisdiction is mainly a territorial concept and that a High Contracting 
Party can only be held responsible for extra-territorial action in exceptional 
cases.109  Yet two of the exceptions mentioned in Al-Skeini might be relevant 
to EU missions: first, situations where the host state has acquiesced to the EU 
exercising some of its public powers110 and second, a situation in which the 
EU exercises effective control of an area.111 
 Before this background, the question for the EU would be whether it 
should exclude the ECtHR’s jurisdiction over such action by making a 
reservation to the ECHR to this effect or excluding the applicability of the 
ECHR to actions and omissions under Title V of the TEU, which deals with the 
CFSP.112  A blanket exclusion of the CFSP would potentially lead to an 
                                            
107 Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway [GC], nos. 71412/01 
and 78166/01, 2 May 2007. 
108 Cf. Articles 42 TEU et seq on the Common Security and Defence Policy; but it is important 
to remember that the exact distribution of responsibility in cases of EU missions under the 
CSDP would very much depend on the particular command structure in place for each 
mission.  This became evident in the recent Al-Jedda case in which the ECtHR distinguished 
Behrami and Saramati since in contrast to Kosovo, the UN had not assumed control over the 
implementation of the Security Council Resolutions rendered with regard to Iraq (Al-Jedda v 
United Kingdom [GC] no. 27021/08, 7 July 2011, para 83).  Thus the violations were fully 
attributable to the United Kingdom as the state whose troops had committed them 
109 Al-Skeini and others v United Kingdom, no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, para 131. 
110 Ibid, para 135. 
111 Ibid, para 138. 
112 This has been suggested by the French government, but many other Member States 
thought such an exclusion to be unacceptable, cf. Council of the EU doc no 16385/11, p 3. 
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exclusion of jurisdiction over restrictive measures adopted under it.113  Since 
measures of this kind are particularly controversial from a human rights 
perspective,114 excluding the ECtHR’s review in these cases would send a 
problematic signal to other Convention parties and might even induce them to 
reject the accession agreement.  One could conceive of a more limited 
exclusion of the ECtHR’s jurisdiction by restricting it to cases over which the 
ECJ has jurisdiction.  This would have the advantage of avoiding the 
asymmetry in jurisdiction mentioned above.  However such an exclusion 
might end up being vague and would force the ECtHR to decide whether the 
ECJ would have had jurisdiction over a given case or not.   
 Moreover, apart from these legal difficulties, a blanket exclusion of the 
CFSP would not be desirable.  The main reason for the inclusion of 
Article 275 TFEU was to preserve the intergovernmental and political 
character of the CFSP and thereby the sovereignty of the Member States.  
This objective would not be in danger if the ECtHR were to exercise 
jurisdiction over violations of human rights committed under the CFSP.  There 
is no danger of the ECtHR interfering with issues touching on the sovereignty 
of the Member States.  Rather, such jurisdiction would remove a peculiar gap 
in the accountability for human rights violations existent at the moment where 
troops operating under the command of an international organization can 
escape scrutiny by the ECtHR whereas troops operating under the command 
of a state party to the ECHR cannot.115  Furthermore, this would not be the 
only case where an asymmetry in jurisdiction would exist after accession.  
After all, the ECtHR will be given jurisdiction to measure primary EU law by 
ECHR standards.  In such cases, the ECJ cannot review the compatibility of 
primary legislation with fundamental rights either.   
 
The ECHR as an integral part EU law 
 
The question of the ECHR’s status in the EU’s legal order may be less 
obvious but is worth exploring.  The main issue is whether the ECHR will be 
directly applicable in EU law and, if so, whether this would be of practical 
relevance given the protection already offered by the EU’s fundamental rights 
laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and recognised as general 
principles of EU law.   
 Under the so-called Haegeman doctrine, international agreements 
concluded by the EU, such as the ECHR, become ‘an integral part of EU 
law’.116  But it does not automatically follow that they are directly applicable, 
i.e. invocable before the courts.  For such effect, the ECJ’s case law demands 
that two further conditions are met.  First, the wording, purpose and nature117 
                                            
113 Depending on the exact formulation of an exclusion, there would be potential for some 
debate over the exact limits of an exclusion since the restrictive measures as such would be 
adopted on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, which might render them reviewable. 
114 A good example is the scenario in the Kadi case, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 
P [2008] ECR I-6351. 
115 Cf. Behrami and Saramati, n 107. 
116 Case 181/73 Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECR 449. 
117 Another formulation found in the ECJ’s case law is ‘the spirit, the general scheme and the 
terms’, cf. Joined Cases 21-24/72 International Fruit Company [1972] ECR 1219. 
26 
 
of the agreement must not exclude direct effect.118  Second, the provision at 
question must be clear, precise and unconditional.119  The ECHR would 
satisfy this test.  It is designed to protect individual rights, which in the words 
of the ECtHR are not ‘theoretical and illusory but practical and effective’.  This 
implies that an individual must be able to rely on them in court.  Furthermore, 
the human rights contained in the ECHR are clear and precise, especially 
when read in light of the vast case law by the ECtHR, and need no further 
implementation.  Thus the ECHR must be considered directly applicable after 
accession.  This will mean a change to the current legal situation under 
Article 6 (3) TEU, which does not affect the relationship between the ECHR 
and national law.120  Yet, as will be shown below, accession to the ECHR will 
not enhance the internal protection of fundamental rights beyond the 
guarantees already provided by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
 There are no further difficulties where actions and omissions by the EU’s 
institutions are at issue before the European Court of Justice: the ECJ must 
apply the Convention.  However, where Member State action is concerned the 
answer is far less clear.  The difficulty stems from the janiform character of 
national authorities:  they act (1) as authorities of the Member States stricto 
sensu, i.e. when implementing Member State legislation drawn up in the 
exercise of the Member State’s own sovereignty and (2) as authorities 
implementing EU law.  The problem is therefore, how to determine under 
which circumstances the ECHR is applicable as part of EU law and under 
which circumstances it is applicable according to the constitutional rules of the 
Member State.  This distinction is important because within the legal orders of 
the Member States, the status of EU law usually differs from the status of 
ordinary international law such as the ECHR.  The United Kingdom is a case 
in point.  Section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972 as interpreted by 
the House of Lords in Factortame121 establishes that European Union law 
takes primacy over domestic law.122  In cases of conflict, the UK’s courts are 
thus under obligation to disapply domestic law in so far as it contradicts EU 
law.  In contrast, where a piece of UK legislation is found to contradict the 
ECHR, the courts are under obligation to interpret that legislation in 
accordance with the ECHR123 and where this is not possible, they can make a 
declaration of incompatibility.124  In the latter case they are nonetheless bound 
to apply the legislation.  If the ECHR were to be applied as part of EU law, 
however, by virtue of the Haegman doctrine it would have to be accorded the 
same effect as EU law  and would thus take primacy over domestic legislation 
in case of a conflict.   
 Regarding the ECHR, the root of the complication lies in the membership 
of both the EU and its Member States to it.  According to Article 216 (2) TFEU, 
                                            
118 Case 12/86 Demirel v Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd [1987] 3719, para 14; such exclusion was 
for instance found regarding the WTO agreements, cf. Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council 
[1999] ECR I-8395 and with regard to the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea, cf. 
Case C-308/06 Intertanko [2008] ECR I-4057. 
119 Demirel, ibid. 
120 Case C-571/10 Kamberaj [2012] ECR I-00000, para 62. 
121 Factortame Ltd. v Secretary of State for Transport (No. 2) [1991] AC 603. 
122 For a detailed discussion cf. P. Craig, Britain in the European Union, in: J. Jowell/D. Oliver 
(eds.) The Changing Constitution, 6th edn. (OUP, Oxford 2007) 84, 91 et seq. 
123 S. 3 Human Rights Act 1998. 
124 S. 4 Human Rights Act 1998. 
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the Union’s agreements are also binding on the Member States.  It should be 
noted that Article 216 (2) TFEU only has internal effect and does not alter the 
responsibility on the international plane.  This means internally the Member 
States are obliged to comply with the entirety of an agreement which was 
concluded by the EU alone.  Where so-called mixed agreements are 
concerned, i.e. agreements concluded by both the EU and its Member States, 
only the EU part of the agreements is binding on the Member States qua EU 
law.  The remaining part is binding on them qua international law.  Since the 
ECHR will be concluded by the EU alone, it will not be a typical ‘mixed 
agreement’.  Nonetheless after accession both EU and all Member States will 
be parties to it so that it should be considered a mixed agreement and the 
question arises in how far the Member States are bound by it as part of EU 
law.  In order to answer this question it is necessary to briefly analyse the 
rationale behind mixed agreements and their potential for direct effect.   
 Mixed agreements are usually concluded because neither the EU nor the 
Member States have the external competence to conclude the agreement 
alone.125  Only those parts of a mixed agreement for which the EU had 
competence are capable of having direct effect under EU law.  For the other 
part the internal effect can only be determined by the Member State’s 
constitutional law.126  But the situation regarding the ECHR is different.  The 
reason why both EU and Member States will eventually be parties to the 
ECHR is not that neither of them would be able to sign up to it independently.  
Thus the question under which circumstances the ECHR is directly applicable 
in the legal orders of the Member States qua EU law, cannot be answered in 
the same manner.  It is thus necessary to take a different approach in order to 
determine its direct effect.   
 To reach a solution, one needs to ask what the rationale for the direct 
effect of EU agreements is.  While the exact conditions for direct effect of 
international agreements and the ECJ’s case law in this respect have 
attracted a lot of scholarly attention127, not much has been said about why 
provisions of such agreements should have such effect, if they fulfil the 
conditions described above.  In the past, the Court largely transposed the 
internal approach to direct effect to international agreements.128  The main 
rationale given by the Court for the direct effect of the EU’s Treaties in van 
Gend129 is the effectiveness of EU law.  By pointing to the Court’s jurisdiction 
                                            
125 M. Maresceau, ‘A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements’ in P. Koutrakos (ed) Mixed 
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to interpret the Treaties given to it under Article 267 TFEU, its argument 
assumed that the involvement of private parties in the enforcement of 
European Union law would enhance its effectiveness.  Enforcement, private 
or public, of European Union law can only occur where European Union law is 
applicable.  This can only be the case where the Member State has acted 
within the scope of EU law.  There is thus a clear parallel to the responsibility 
of the Member States under Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.130  Applied to the ECHR, this would include cases of Member State 
action on the basis of a provision of EU law and the compatibility of 
implementing legislation with the Convention.   
 A further question then is whether the Member States would also be 
responsible under the Convention for derogating from EU law.131  An answer 
would certainly depend on whether a fundamental right under the Convention 
is interfered with in such cases.  A look at the classic examples from the 
ECJ’s case law reveals that this is hardly conceivable.  For instance in 
Schmidberger the situation was such that Schmidberger’s right to free 
movement of goods was restricted in order to allow a demonstration to take 
place.  Thus none of Schmidberger’s Convention rights had been at issue.  In 
a similar vein, in Omega the claimant’s freedom to provide services was 
affected but not its rights under the Convention.  Thus derogation cases will 
probably be of no relevance in this respect. 
 The discussion has so far established that the Member States would be 
bound by the ECHR as part of EU law where their authorities implement 
obligations under EU law.  The question is how this outcome can be squared 
with Article 6 (2) TEU, which postulates that ‘[…] accession shall not affect the 
Union’s competences […]’.  Coupled with Article 2 of Protocol No 8 to the 
Treaty of Lisbon, which provides that the accession agreement ‘shall ensure 
that nothing therein affects the situation of the Member States in relation to 
the European Convention’, this provision shows that accession must not lead 
to an increase in the competences of the Union.  Conscious of these 
limitations contained in the Treaties, the drafters of the accession agreement 
provided in Article 1 (2) (c) that ‘nothing in this agreement shall require the 
European Union to perform an act or adopt a measure for which it has no 
competence under European Union law.’  It is submitted that the result just 
reached does not contradict this objective.  The Union’s own fundamental 
rights already reach this far.  The only true limit which Article 6 (2) TEU and 
the Protocol might impose upon the drafters of the accession Treaty relates to 
the Protocols to which the Union may sign up.  The draft agreement foresees 
that the EU accedes to the Convention and the first and sixth Protocol.  Since 
all Member States are already parties to these two protocols, accession will 
not substantially affect them.  Furthermore, all rights guaranteed in these two 
Protocols are already existent in EU law today.   
 Yet the parallelism to Article 51 (1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
raises the question whether the potential direct effect of the ECHR has any 
practical relevance given that the Charter provides more extensive protection 
and ranks higher than the ECHR in the hierarchy of the sources of EU law.  
                                            
130 On the debate surrounding the interpretation of that provision cf. P. Craig, The Lisbon 
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All rights contained in the Convention are equally guaranteed in the Charter.  
Moreover, Article 52 (3) of the Charter provides that the Convention rights 
which correspond to the rights in the Charter should have the same meaning 
and scope unless EU law provides for more extensive protection.  This in 
effect makes the ECHR the minimum standard for human rights protection in 
the EU.   
 However, there is the UK and Polish Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty132, 
which by some has been hailed as an opt-out of the Charter by these two 
Member States.  The view that the Protocol has led to the United Kingdom 
and Poland not being bound by the Charter seems to have been adopted by a 
judge in the High Court of England and Wales, who stated that ‘[g]iven the […] 
Protocol, the Charter cannot be relied on as against the United Kingdom 
[…]’.133  The Court of Appeal made a preliminary reference in the case to the 
Court of Justice inter alia asking about the relevance of the UK/Polish 
Protocol.134  It is interesting to note that the UK government’s representative 
before the Court of Appeal argued that the High Court Judge erred in its 
assessment, stating that ‘the purpose of the Protocol is not to prevent the 
Charter from applying to the United Kingdom, but to explain its effect’.135  In 
her Opinion, Advocate General Trstenjak agreed with most commentators that 
Article 1 (1) of that Protocol does not have any effect on the Court of Justice’s 
jurisdiction to find UK law to be inconsistent with the rights contained in the 
Charter since the wording of that Article is limited in that it only provides that 
the jurisdiction of the ECJ is not extended.136  This view was also taken by the 
ECJ.137  In view of the ECJ’s finding, the ECHR will thus not have any 
practically relevant internal effect in the Member States.   Thus the 
ECHR’s status post-accession as an integral part of European Union law will 
have no practical consequences for the human rights protection in the 
Member States.  Where a Member State acts within the scope of EU law, it is 
already bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which goes further than 
the ECHR.  Where the Member State acts outside the scope of EU law, the 
ECHR will apply to it in the same manner as today, i.e. in accordance with its 
own domestic law. 
 
Binding decisions by ECtHR? 
 
While the ECHR’s effects as an integral part of EU law will hardly be of 
practical relevance, the same cannot be said for the effect of the ECtHR’s 
decisions in cases brought against the EU.  After accession the ECJ could be 
tempted to apply its famous dictum from Opinion 1/91: 
                                            
132 Protocol No 30 to the Treaty of Lisbon [2010] OJ C83/313. 
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Where, however, an international agreement provides for its own system of 
courts, including a court with jurisdiction to settle disputes between the 
Contracting Parties to the agreement, and, as a result to interpret its 
provisions, the decisions of that court will be binding on the Community 
institutions, including the Court of Justice.  Those decisions will also be 
binding in the event that the Court of Justice is called upon to rule, by way of 
preliminary ruling or in a direct action, on the interpretation of the 
international agreement, in so far as that agreement is an integral part of the 
Community legal order.139  
The ECHR is an international agreement with its own court, so that the dictum 
appears to be applicable.140  This is underscored by the rationale behind the 
binding effect such decisions have on the institutions of the EU.  If an 
agreement provides that the parties to it must follow the decisions of the Court 
established to interpret the agreement, the EU and its institutions (including 
the ECJ), must be deemed to be bound by these decisions.  But it is not clear 
from Opinion 1/91 how far that binding effect would go.  It is unlikely that the 
ECJ envisaged a bindingness akin to a doctrine of stare decisis since such a 
doctrine does not exist anywhere in EU law or international law.  Moreover, 
under international law only the decisions rendered in proceedings to which 
the EU was a party, are binding on it.  Considering that the rationale behind 
the dictum in Opinion 1/91 can be found in international law, the ECJ can only 
be bound a decision where the EU was a party to the case.  Furthermore, 
Article 46 ECHR shows that the decisions of the ECtHR are only binding inter 
partes.  Therefore, under the ECHR, the ECJ can only be bound by those 
decisions to which the EU was a party.  It is suggested that the ECJ did not 
intend the bindingness of such decisions to go further than is required by 
international law standards.  It follows that where the ECtHR finds that the EU 
has violated the rights guaranteed in the ECHR, the ECJ will be bound by that 
decision when interpreting provisions of the ECHR in a subsequent case 
dealing with the same issue.  Such a situation might, for example, arise where 
the applicant has suffered a damage due to the EU’s human rights violation 
and then holds the EU responsible under 340 (2) TFEU.141  In such a case, 
the ECJ would be required to decide whether there has been a violation of the 
ECHR.  Where the applicant has already obtained a decision in her favour, 
the ECJ would be bound to follow that judgment.   
 
Conclusions 
 
This contribution has tried to show that EU accession to the ECHR raises 
complex questions.  The drafters of the accession agreement largely 
managed to live up to their original ambition which was to preserve the ECHR 
system and only make the adaptations which are necessary.142  Yet this 
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ambition has led to an unsatisfactory solution as regards the co-respondent 
mechanism.  While the voluntariness of the mechanism may be a matter for 
debate, the treatment of omissions is unresolved and contains the potential 
for conflict.  Procedurally, the co-respondent mechanism and the prior 
involvement of the ECJ annexed to it will prolong proceedings and make them 
more complex.  In contrast, the practical effects of accession are only limited 
in view of an already strong catalogue of human rights existent at EU level 
and of the responsibility of the Member States in the ECtHR for most EU 
action.  The main improvement is therefore to be seen in the ECtHR’s new 
jurisdiction over cases such as Connolly.  A further improvement, which 
should perhaps not be underestimated, is the growing awareness within the 
EU’s institutions that an external review will be possible.  Recent changes to 
the EU’s internal human rights monitoring such as the provision for a human 
rights watchdog for the EU’s border agency FRONTEX can be seen in this 
light.143 
 But whether the accession agreement as it currently stands will be the 
(happy) end to a story of epic proportions remains to be seen.  It is likely that 
further chapters to the accession saga will be added.  The EU is currently in 
the process of adopting the internal rules governing its membership of the 
ECHR, in particular the rules relating to the prior involvement of the ECJ.  
Once these have been agreed, it is likely that the ECJ will be asked for an 
Opinion under Article 218 (11) TFEU on whether the agreement and the 
internal rules are compatible with the exigencies of the EU Treaties.  Even if 
the ECJ gives the agreement a green light, it is likely that the agreement will 
come under two further types of pressure:  First, as the recent discussions in 
the Council of Ministers, to which this paper has referred, have shown, the 
parties concerned may not be happy with the content of the agreement and 
demand amendments.  This may cause further delay in achieving accession.  
Second, there may be reasons extraneous to the actual agreement which 
might lead parties to the Convention to block accession.  In this context one 
should remember the difficult birth of Protocol 14 which for a long time was 
blocked by Russia for political reasons.   
 It would therefore be overly optimistic to regard the draft agreement as the 
final word of the epic of the EU’s accession to the ECHR.  But it marks the 
beginning not only of its final chapter but also beckons an entirely new story 
on the EU’s membership of the ECHR.   
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